Philosophy of Science

The Philosophy of Science is the branch of Philosophy which deals with the study of Science (in the sense of “Natural Science”). The Philosophy of Science is closely related to many areas in Metaphysics such as Teleology, as well as Epistemology, Logic, and even Ethics. Philosophers of Science seek to explain the very nature of scientific evidence and statements, the way in which these are produced, how they provide us with power over our environment. This of course has implications for Science and for society in general.

Part of the difficulty in the Anglo-American academic world is that the Philosophy of Science is beholden to the departments in Science and Engineering, and those departments generate funding, while Philosophy often does not. Science is expensive. So, the present discipline has arisen to discuss and essentially provide “philosophical cover” for what scientists do. This of course leads to ethical issues. Continental philosophers, on the other hand, do not practice Philosophy of Science in the same way, and do not use their Philosophy to support Science - their view is quite the opposite.

This article is not exhaustive, and covers only those topics seen as central by key philosophers in the field. As with Philosophy in general, there are schools of scientific thought, each of which adheres to its own principles. For example, scientific “statements” link to and are subject to our experiences or observations. “Empiricism” is the doctrine that Knowledge derives from Experience of the World, which is in contrast to “Rationalism” or “Idealism”, the doctrine that Knowledge derives from Ideas.

Philosophies of Science

Experiments are Observations that have been set up to test Hypotheses. They are used to gather information through our senses via empirical methods which many humans are capable of experiencing. Once reproduced independently by scientists, the information counts as Evidence, upon which the scientific community will base an Explanation or Theory of how things work. Observations can involve the Philosophy of Perception, and so are themselves often Cognitive Acts, that is, Observations which are themselves embedded in our understanding of the way in which the World works, and as this understanding changes, so the Observations may apparently change. Thus, scientists rely on independent and mechanical, or instrumental, Measurements and Observations rather than human perception, and they use the logical methods of Deduction and Induction to work instrumental observations into a coherent and self-consistent structure.

Realism

Realism, or “Naïve Empiricism”, derives from John Locke and empiricists. It is the belief that scientific statements are about a World that exists independently of our ideas and theories about it. Realists hold that electrons and magnetic fields, for example, actually exist “out there”. This is “naïve” in the sense of being straightforward, and is the view that most scientists would themselves adopt, because it is not entirely wrong. For realists, the empirical method is used to test theories against the “real” World.

Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism derives from John Dewey and others describing Pragmatism. In contrast to Realism, the predictive power of scientific statements is emphasized. To an instrumentalist, electrons and magnetic fields are convenient ideas which do not necessarily correspond to some “real” World, but which are important because they permit us to control and predict events in our environment. Instrumentalism is a subtle difference from Realism, and the similar Phenomenalism. For instrumentalists, the empirical method is used to show the theories are consistent with observations.

Constructivism

Some historians, philosophers, and sociologists believe that scientific theories are shaped by their social and political contexts. This approach is usually known as Constructivism, which is an extension of Instrumentalism incorporating the social aspects of Science. In its strongest form, constructivists see Science as merely a discourse between scientists, with objective facts playing a small role, if any. A weaker form of the constructivist position holds that social factors play a large role in the acceptance of new scientific theories. Electrons and magnetic fields are simply objects of conversation, and establishing “correspondence” between they and theory is problematic. It becomes difficult, then, to explain how Science differs from any other discipline.

Reductionism

Reductionism is the activity of breaking an observation or theory down into simpler concepts in order to understand it. Such analysis is as essential to Science as it is to all rational thinking. Perhaps an historical event might be explained in sociological and psychological terms, which in turn might be reduced to physiology and ultimately to Chemistry and Physics. Reductionism can be seen as a threat to Free Will, and this “greedy Reductionism”, as Daniel Dennett called it, is “bad science”, seeking to find explanations which are appealing or eloquent rather than those that are of use in predicting natural phenomena.

The Justification of Scientific Statements

The most powerful statements in Science are those with the widest applicability. Issac Newton's Second Law - “for every action there is an opposite and equal reaction” - is a powerful statement because it applies to every action, anywhere, at any time. But it is literally impossible for scientists to have tested every single incidence, action, and reaction. How is it, then, that we can assert the Second Law is at all true? It is because many similar actions have been tested and reproduced, and all have revealed a corresponding reaction. Immanuel Kant argued that we can be sure the next time we test the Second Law, it will be found true, because of what he called “Synthetic a Priori” Knowledge, that is, Knowledge which we generate ourselves prior to having experienced the forthcoming event. While it is Inductive Reasoning, it nevertheless is what we have to work with, for Kant.

Deduction and Induction

Inductive Reason maintains that if a situation holds in all observed cases, then that the situation holds in all such cases, all else being equal. So, after completing a series of experiments that support the Second Law, one is justified in maintaining that the Law holds in all cases. We can't use Deduction in the same way, which is the process of moving logically from a premise to a conclusion, because there is simply no valid form of Argument or Syllogism which will allow such a move. No matter how many times we observe white swans, no matter in how many different locations, or by how many different teams of scientists, there is simply no deductive path which leads to the conclusion that “all swans are white”. Such a conclusion would be wrong, of course.

Falsifiability

From Karl Popper's work we have the concept of Falsifiability. The aim is to re-introduce Deductive Reasoning into the debate. It is not possible to deduce a general statement from a series of specific ones, but it is possible for one specific statement to prove that a general statement is false. Finding one black swan is necessary and sufficient to show that 'all swans are white' is false. However, this introduces its own difficulties. When an apparent falsification occurs, it is always possible to introduce an addition to a theory that will render it unfalsified. So, for instance, ornithologists might have argued that a black swan found was not technically a member of the same species or genus. Falsifiability can lead to knee-jerk reactionary statements and theories.

Foundationalism and Coherentism

Foundationalism says that there are some basic statements that do not require justification. Both Induction and Falsifiability are forms of Foundationalism in that they rely on basic statements that derive directly from observations. However, human observation is a cognitive act, relying on Perception and Understanding, even Belief. Coherentism offers an alternative by claiming that statements can be justified by their being a part of a coherent system. The complete set of Beliefs of an Individual or Community comes into play, per W.V.O. Quine, who argued that where an observation is at odds with one of these auxiliary beliefs, an adjustment in the system will be required to remove the contradiction.

Occam's Razor

Finally, Occam's Razor is another notable touchstone in the Philosophy of Science. William of Ockham (or Ockhegm) suggested that the simplest account which “explains” the Phenomenon is to be preferred. He did not suggest that it would be automatically true, but that it across many explanations it would have the tendency to be, well, possibly truer. However, Occam's Razor is often abused and cited where inapplicable. It does not say that the simplest account is to be preferred regardless of its capacity to explain outliers, exceptions, or other phenomena in question. The Principle of Falsifiability requires that any exception that can be reliably reproduced should invalidate the simplest theory, and the next-simplest account which can actually incorporate the exception as part of the theory should then be preferred to the first. The problem is, what is “simple” and what is “complex”? The answer leads us back into Teleology.

The Problem of Science

A critical theme in Science is to what degree the body of scientific knowledge can be taken as an indicator of anything which is actually “true” about the World. The acceptance of Knowledge as if it were unquestionable, as if a Theology or Ideology, is rejected by scientists on the one hand, embraced on the other. Science is political. It is common for the public to believe that scientists make claims of infallibility based very much on ideological grounds, funding streams, or political expediency, and philosophers are bound up with the same.

Many are concerned about the wide disparity between how scientists work and how their work is perceived. Many scientists are thus involved in Public Education campaigns to persuade lay people in high schools and colleges about scientific principles and methods. However, we live in an Age of Misinformation. Paul Feyerabend argued that no description of Scientific Method could possibly be broad enough to encompass all the approaches and methods used by scientists, and any attempt to prescribe or describe it would stifle and cramp scientific progress. Feyerabend claimed, “The only principle that does not inhibit progress is 'anything goes'”. So it is with misinformation as well.

Scholarship by M.R.M. Parrott

Dynamism: Life: Volume II: Biological Chemistry and Epistemology Philosophy and Science Treatise ©2001, 2010-2011 M.R.M. Parrott First Published: Jun 2011 Published by rimric press 0-9746106-5-8 | 978-0-9746106-5-8 216 Pages, Paperback & eBook, 2025 2025 Edition Extras: Afterword, Notes on the Text and Cover Art Amazon Paperback (author) Barnes & Noble Paperback (author) Waterstones Paperback (author)

Dynamism: Force: Volume I: Quantum Physics and Ontology Philosophy and Science Treatise ©2001-2004 M.R.M. Parrott First Published: Feb 05/Jun 11 Published by rimric press 0-9746106-1-5 | 978-0-9746106-1-0 204 Pages, Paperback & eBook, 2025 2025 Edition Extras: Both Prefaces, Afterword, Notes on the Text and Cover Art Amazon Paperback (author) Barnes & Noble Paperback (author) Waterstones Paperback (author)

Philosophers of Science

• Empedocles
• Roger Bacon
• Galileo Galilei
• Francis Bacon
• René Descartes
• Issac Newton
• Immanuel Kant
• Auguste Comte
• Charles Sanders Peirce
• Karl Popper
• Michael Polanyi
• John Dewey
• Thomas Kuhn
• Paul Feyerabend
• Daniel Dennett

Related Philosophy of Science Topics

• Causality, Duality, Free Will, Freedom, and Determinism

References

• Snyder, Paul, Toward One Science: The Convergence of Traditions, St Martin's Press, 1977, cloth ISBN 0-312-81011-3, paper ISBN 0-312-81012-1.
• Van Fraassen, Bas C., The Scientific Image, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980, ISBN 0-198-24427-4.
• Parrott, M.R.M., books in Philosophy and Science, including “The Generation of X” (1995), “The Ethos of Modernity” (1996), “The Empiricism of Subjectivity” (1997), “The Pure Critique of Reason” (1999), “Synthetic A Priori” (1999), “Dynamism: Volume I: Force” (2005), “Dynamism: Volume II: Life” (2011)